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Suffering and Climate Change Narratives
A great deal of work on the topic of suffering (including m uch of the work in the essays of the special issue of which this article is a part) uses the concept of suffering as if it is non -problematic, as if it is an fully understood concept that can be used instrum entally like a pair of eye glasses or like a m etal detector to reveal, uncover, and help m ake things comprehensible-and for literary studies, these things would be prim arily plot or them atic issues. There is a surprising sparsity of scholarship demonstrating a recognition that suffering as a concept itself needs to be theorized, especially in relation to literary and cultural narratives. What is also surprising is that there is relatively little in the literature theorizing suffering that looks at the cultural value of suffering -indeed, its cultural necessity. Theorizing about suffering without recognizing the its social and cultural role is like discussing air pollution without recognizing the foundational im portance of atm ospheric CO2-interesting, perhaps, but ultim ately without practical value. Finally, with at least a prelim inary and working set of theories about suffering, it is reasonable to question the psychological purposes and effects of clim ate change discourse and to posit that one of the reasons for the radical failures of clim ate change discourse to m otivate real social adjustm ents is that it sim ply fulfills other apparently m ore pressing needs.
Of the work that has been done theorizing suffering, there are two m onographs that stand out. The collection by Jeff Malpas and Norelle Lickiss entitled Perspectives on Human Suffering is one of these. It covers a vast range of perspectives, including history, law, philosophy, m edicine, and literature. The other truly standout book is Joseph A. Am ato's Victims and Values: a History and Theory of Suffering. The discussion that follows builds on the foundational work of these two books but is m otivated by two apparently unrelated ideas from two other very different scholars: Tim othy Morton's the notion of "spectators to future ruin" (2), articulated as a kind of throw-away in a brilliant discussion of "the ecological thought;" and E. Ann Kaplan's discussion of what she terms "the genre of pretrauma" (23) in her rem arkable Climate Trauma: Foreseeing the Future in Dystopian Film and Fiction-and at least part of what I will be arguing here is that, infused with assurances of an im m inent and em inently m enacing future, clim ate change discourse is the discourse of pre -suffering.
But what exactly does suffering cover, and what is it not? Physician Eric J. Cassell explained in 1982 that suffering is not sim ply and certainly not exclusively about bodily pain, and "pain and suffering . . . are phenomenologically distinct" (641). "Suffering" and "pain" are not synonyms. Pain need not involve suffering, but suffering involves pain. Suffering has a tragic dim ension; pain does not. Suffering, Joseph Am ato explains, deals with spirit rather than body. Suffering is greater and more comprehensive than pain . . . Suffering does not invite specific and immediate remedies. Even if it is considered curable, it is understood to elude the particular acts of healing by doctor and magician. Its cure, in contrast to pain, requires diverse and protracted human treatment or great and special powers of the gods. Acc ordingly, as pain seeks its relief almost exclusively in magic and medicine, suffering directs us for help to philosophy and religion and, also, more recently to social work and psychoanalysis. (15) Pain produces suffering under specific circumstances: "People frequently report suffering from pain when they feel out of control, when the pain is overwhelming, when the source of pain is unknown, when the m eaning of the pain is dire, or when the pain is chronic" (Cassell 641). 1 One of the im plications here is that suffering is clearly linked to the notion of control. It is what happens when the person is out of control.
Cassell m aintains that suffering offers an ultim ate loss of control, "the threat of disintegration" (640), but it seems m ore accurate to see pain itself, rather than the suffering, as the threat. This is a point that Elaine Scarry m akes three years later in her phenomenal The Body in Pain: "Intense pain is . . . language-destroying: as the content of one's world disintegrates, so the content of one's language disintegrates; as the self disintegrates, so that which would express and project the self is robbed of its source and its subject" (35). Nevertheless, it is obviously very productive to include the function and effects of pain when theorizing about suffering. Philosopher Lucy Tatm an puts the case well: there is a "shocking corporeality of suffering. In Beauvoirian term s, those who suffer are m ired in the im manence CLCWeb: Comparative Literature and Culture 21.5 (2019) : <http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/clcweb/vol 21/iss5/11> Special Issue Suffering, Endurance, Understanding. Ed. Simon Estok, Douglas Berman, and Frank Stevenson of their own flesh; they cannot transcend their em bodied anguish. It does not m atter if the cause of their pain had nothing to do with their own bodies, soon enough the anguish penetrates through their bones, their blood, their skin, their pores. It is as though the entire body of the sufferer becom es polluted with suffering" (44). Tatm an explains that suffering as a concept is inherently gendered and that the very term s associated with and defining suffering, such as "weakness, fragility, corporeality, pollution, em otion . . . [are] traditionally associated with the feminine" (44). She explains that she is rem inded of "a bad joke. 'What do you call a wom an who suffers on behalf of others?' 'Mother.' 'What do you call a m an who suffers on behalf of others?' 'God.'" Bad, perhaps, but it does lead to an understanding that "the logic wrapped around suffering is steeped in gendered expectations and value judgm ents" (46). Ironically, it is a heavily gendered Nature that in clim ate change narratives prom ise suffering for a presumed m ale audience-hence, a recent Brad Pitt m ovie entitled World War Z has a doctor ranting about nature in the following m anner:
Mother Nature is a serial killer. No one's better. More creative. Like all serial killers, she can't help the urge to want to get caught. What good are all those brilliant crimes if no one takes the credit? Now the hard partwhile you spend a decade in school-is seeing the crumbs for the clues there. Sometimes the thing you thought was the most brutal aspect of the virus turns out to be the chink in its arm or. And she loves disguising her weaknesses as strengths. She's a bitch.
And then there is Alvin Duvernay in The Age of Stupid: "You stare Mother Nature in the eye. Usually, she's fairly benign. Then she com es along, m ethodically, ruthlessly. And then she stands toe-to-toe with you and dares you. Dares you: 'Go ahead and get your best equipment out. Go ahead. Do it. Let's dance.'" Such sexist, anthropomorphic metaphors of a m alevolent nature are counter-productive and are obviously not going to help m ake o ur environmental crises any better; on the contrary, such sentim ents (although they m ay sell well) are sim ply perpetuating the idea that nature (and women) are to be controlled.
Sexism sells well, and it sells whatever it is attached with. As Greta Gaard rem inds us, however, it is not the m en who are, in fact, m ost affected by clim ate change and who suffer its consequences: we are to "m ake no m istake: wom en are indeed the ones m ost severely affected by clim ate change and natural disasters, but their vulnerability is not innate; rather, it is the result of inequities produced through gendered social roles, discrim ination, and poverty" (23). It is plainly naïve, therefore, to pretend that the suffering im agined in clim ate change is a given, is singular, is free of gender and class and race im plications, or that it can be discussed unproblematically. Indeed, in a great deal of clim ate change narratives, the im agined source of suffering is erroneously gendered female, and the im agined victim is erroneously im agined m ale. Am ato explains that "culture profoundly shapes what we consider suffering to be. It indicates whose suffering counts, what kinds of suffering are valid, and what can and should be done in response to different types of suffering" (15). In m ainstream clim ate change narratives, the culture that im agines forthcoming suffering is deeply sexist, and it is this sexism that determines the shapes and nuances of the suffering it writes.
Other distinctions need to be acknowledged when we talk about sufferin g. There is, for instance, as Eric Cassell has noted, the distinction between physical and nonphysical sources of suffering, a distinction laypeople tend not to m ake but that physicians do m ake (see Cassell 640) . Another point Cassell proposes is that suffering is a concept that applies to persons rather than nonhuman anim als or things. To lim it suffering to persons seems (to m e) arbitrary, since the core elem ents that com prise suffering (an unpleasant perception that current pain m ay lead to future harm ) applies to m any sentient nonhuman anim als. Certainly, there is am ple reason to allow for a categorical distinction between human and nonhuman suffering but not for an exclusion of nonhuman anim als as a group that can experience suffering. To extend the definition to organism s incapable of im agining either a future or a threat to that future, however, does not seem entirely viable. Thus, it seems unconvincing to im agine that grapes, celery, or Portobello m ushrooms can suffer-and if indeed they can, then it is without a central nervous system that they would do so. Ants, puppies, and rats, on the other hand, do actively avoid danger to sidestep future ruin; even so, show m e an ant with a tortured psyche, and I'll gladly go on record saying that ants suffer. A rat? Yes. A dog? Yes. Both can go insane. A West African leaf beetle? I don't think so. Am ato's prem ise (cited above) that suffering "deals with spirit rather than body" (15) seems a useful, if rough, touchstone in defining suffering.
For Cassell, "m ost generally, suffering can be defined as the state of severe distress associated with events that threaten the intactness of the person" (640, em phasis added). It is a pervasive part of the hum an experience. Som e have argued that it is an essential part and th at suffering is as inevitable as death and even seems in som e way to constitute at least a part of what it m eans to be human; indeed, Jeff Malpas and Norelle Lickiss suggest "that it seems we cannot address the question of what it is to be hum an without also attending to the question of what it is to suffer, of how suffering is to be understood, and of what suffering calls for by way of response" (1). But the fact that suffering is constitutive of what it m eans to be hum an does not preclude possibilities fo r the sim ilarly constitutive function of suffering for nonhuman anim als. The growing calls for expansion of the category of "legal persons" status obviously has substantial im plications for those who argue that "suffering is ultim ately a personal m atter" (Cassell 640) . When we think of how public m edia personalizes im pending traumas that will result from clim ate change, m ost probably think of this only in hum an term s; but clim ate change obviously will have individual (and som etimes personal, in the sense of "legal persons") im plications for nonhuman and hum an anim als the world over-not to m ention plants, fish, and nonbiotic landscapes. We need to question how and with what effect m edia personalizes im pending trauma and suffering and how audiences are interpellated as spectators to future ruin. As I sat writing this in Seoul, hurricanes Irm a and Maria were m aking their way across the Caribbean, and news m edia were tracking them, reporting on the dam age they had done and were doing. CNN offered dire warnings of the horrors to com e in Florida, but Maria seem ed to catch people somewhat by surprise (and one has to wonder how race and class played into all of this). After Maria, headlines included the word "apocalyptic" (see Narayan, and Chavez) .
There is an undeniable apocalyptic content in news m edia coverage of clim ate change, and the responsibility for large part of the pre -suffering that is em bodied in such narratives alm ost invariably falls to nature. Nature is the villain, and hum anity will suffer from this villainy. "Irm a begins lashing Florida," cnn.com reads as I write this. It is not an evasion of responsibility for the hum an hand in clim ate change that such narratives display. Indeed, even when hum anity is understood as the cause of clim ate change, it is still the threat of suffering, of pain, of deprivation, of loss, of unpredictability, and of unwanted change that nature threatens. There is an increasing sense of inevitability about our disintegration. We see it in Roy Scranton's sensationally-entitled New York Times op-ed "Learning How to Die in the Anthropocene" (later a book of short essays) that offers what seems a not very productive nihilist set of suggestions that "civilization is already dead," that "there's nothing we can do to save ourselves," and that "if we want to learn to live in the Anthrop ocene, we m ust first learn how to die." In such a narrative, our disintegration is an inevitability, our suffering assured. Scranton works on the assum ption that the Anthropocene is something new, that humanity has only recently begun to change the planet, the clim ate, the biosphere, and so on, and that these monumental changes are fatal blows.
With increasing consciousness about the rising scale of anthropogenic effects on climate, the m arket for books im agining suffering and clim ate change is burgeoning (hence, a broad appeal of books such as Diane Ackerm an's The Human Age: The World Shaped by Us, Elizabeth Kolbert's The Sixth Extinction: An Unnatural History, Naom i Klein's This Changes Everything: Capitalism vs Climate, and so on); however, som e of this m aterial sensationalizes suffering with specious logic and faulty data. For instance, in her discussion of Genghis Khan, Ackerm an claim s that "one can only surm ise that wiping out the genes of others and planting your own (what we call genocide) m ust come naturally to our kind, as it does to som e other anim als, from ants to lions" (273). The com ment is neither logical nor defensible. She offers no em pirical evidence for such a hypothesis that would naturalize things such as the Holocaust. Som e people eat feces. Using Ackerman's logic, we could surmise that coprophagy comes naturally to our species. Other comments also sim ply fly in the face of truth: "Nature is thrifty" (281), Ackerm an claim s, but clearly the evidence points in a different direction. The 100 year-old pine tree outside the window of m y Canadian residence produces thousands of pine cones per year, each with scores of seeds for which "thrifty" is hardly the word. Any population without a check on its growth will proliferate to superabundance. 2 Ackerm an talks about how "wood, coal, oil, and gas were only interm ediaries after all, and using them was a sign of our im m aturity as a species" (106), but she is ignoring the fact that our use of renewable resources far pre -dates our use of non-renewables and fossil fuels. Nor does Ackerman reference any of the pioneering work of ecofeminists about co -inhabiting in a world with other-than-human species, and the result is that the insistence of im ages threatening hardship and suffering lacks nuanced understandings of the causes. Ackerman's unproblematic uses of CLCWeb: Comparative Literature and Culture 21.5 (2019): <http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/clcweb/vol 21/iss5/11> Special Issue Suffering, Endurance, Understanding. Ed. Simon Estok, Douglas Berman, and Frank Stevenson the first-person plural pronoun in "the world shaped by us" effaces race and gender privileges and their constitutive roles in producing landscapes of suffering, the scale of which is unprecedented. 3 The scale of hum an influence is increasing, to be sure, on what seems an exponential trajectory, and with it the prom ise of suffering, but the dynam ic itself is not new. The threat to our integrity-a threat that is at the very core of any definition of suffering -is not new. Our integrity has only rarely been assured. Our survival has never been a guarantee. Our radical influence on the planet is sim ilarly longstanding. 4 Elizabeth Kolbert has noted that "one argum ent against the idea that a new hum andom inated epoch has recently begun is that hum ans have been changing the planet for a long time already, indeed practically since the start of the Holocene." She is not alone. William F. Ruddim an, for instance, argues "that the Anthropocene actually began thousands of years ago as a result of the discovery of agriculture and subsequent technological innovations in the practice of farm ing" (26 1)and it is not just hot air: Ruddim an offers extensive data verifying beyond any doubt that the volume of two of the m ost powerful gases influencing clim ate change -CH4 (m ethane) and CO2 (carbon dioxide)-has, for thousands of years, been deeply regulated by hum an activities such as agriculture and the wide-spread rem oval of forests. Bruce Sm ith and Melinda Zeder sim ilarly place "the onset of the Anthropocene alm ost ten thousand years earlier, at the Pleistocene-Holocene boundary" (8), claim ing that "the beginning of the Anthropocene can be usefully defined in term s of when evidence of significant human capacity for ecosystem engineering or niche construction behaviors first appear in the archeological record on a global scale" (8-9, emphasis in original). I would like to suggest here that one reason why m ost scholars (and m ost m edia) have viewed the term "Anthropocene" in reference to post-Industrial Revolution anthropogenic effects on the world m ight have to do with the sheer scale of changes currently underway. Things are bad enough to threaten our own existence now, and somehow we firm ly believe that we have never faced threats of extinction before. We have always faced extinction. Yet, while it is an inevitability, it has not always been as prom inent in our collective consciousness as now. Conscious though we have always been about the possibilities of our own ruin (and this consciousness is an undeniably central part of hum an ontology), proxim ity is the key here: the threat of disintegration at a safe and controlled distance is fine, distance both in term s of affect and space. Clim ate change narratives bring the threats of ruin into our living room s.
The threat of the disintegration of the self is best kept at a safe distance. One of the fundam entally different things about this century from the previous one is the proxim ity of unpredictable m aterial danger. There were odd and terrifying m om ents when the world held its breath as the year 2000 approached, but the fears about computer terror were unfounded: Y2K chaos never m aterialized. From Y2K to 9/11 to Katrina to Maria to the psychoses that prom pt things such as the Manchester Arena bom bing, the Las Vegas Massacre, and the Bataclan attac k, we m ay rightly be said to have entered an Age of Terror. Unpredictability has become the new norm for an increasingly anxious global community and how it sees both social conflict and environmental events.
As Diane Ackerm an explains, "nature rem ains unpredictable" (47) for hum anity: "If there's one unchanging fact about hum ans it's that we loathe change in nature, perhaps because we feel we can't control it . . . we yearn for continuity, and yet we live in a wildly changing world" (42). At least part of what pervades the news m edia coverage of extrem e weather events (including the dire predictions of extrem e weather events to come, part-and-parcel with clim ate change) is what Ackerm an describes as "the tone of dread and loathing, a panic about being invaded by wildness and roughly overtaken by the chaotic forces of nature" (121). Ackerm an talks about "how conflicted we really are about nature (126) and about how while we fear the unpredictability and agency of nature to the core of our being, we also "care deeply about scores of life form s with whom we share the planet, even though they're not fam ily m em bers, not even species m embers, for that m atter, not possessions, and not personal friends. We care abstractly about whole populations we m ay not have seen firsthand, determined to help fellow creatures survive. We feel a powerfully m ingled kinship" (133). We strive to m aintain things, in part because so doing keeps things predictable. CLCWeb: Comparative Literature and Culture 21.5 (2019): <http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/clcweb/vol 21/iss5/11> Special Issue Suffering, Endurance, Understanding. Ed. Simon Estok, Douglas Berman, and Frank Stevenson It is fears about unpredictability that feature so heavily in twenty-first-century representations of the natural environm ent, representations that are defined by terror and ecophobia. Beginning with terror and characterized in large part by a growing consciousness of unpredictable dangers, the twenty-firstcentury has seen an increasing social packaging of terror and nature together. George Marshall observes that "it is now routine to include clim ate change as a potential threat to US National Security" (76). 5 News m edia and film have been a sizeable com ponent of this packaging of ecophobia and terror, and the effects have been profound. We witness not only the radical blurring of spatial/national boundaries but also of tem poral ones. A bid to both sell narratives and to represent control, im agining terror and nature together presents im ages and narratives that are both riling and num bing, galling and entertaining, urgent and trivial.
Wayne Hudson-in a chapter of Perspectives on Human Suffering entitled "Historicizing Suffering"defines suffering as "a negative basic feeling or em otion that involves a subjective character of unpleasantness, aversion, harm , or threat of harm to body or m ind." In his review of the param eters of the term , Hudson goes on to note that there are several distinctions that theorists have m ade of suffering: "physical suffering, which can often be am eliorated by m edical, political, and economic m easures, mental suffering, which can continue to resist treatment, and ontological suffering, including death, where the suffering turns on the lack of positive m eaning and the ultim acy of the experience rather than the am ount of pain as such" (171). Often, these different types of suffering are intertwinedor are im agined to be. Im agining suffering is not what it used to be.
Im agining suffering has a substantial artistic history, and when we think of representations of suffering in literature, no work springs to m ind m ore readily than Shakespeare's King Lear, with, perhaps The Book of Job seeming an exception. Yet, the pain of Job has causes and rewards, however ineffable, that seem to require a different word than "suffering." Lear, on the other hand, receives no holy shrugs or sm iles, no indication of sacred recompense or recognition, no reason. His pain is not a test from God, or a divine lesson, or a predictable result in a logical sequence of events. True, it all stem s from his stupid love test, but it is all out of proportion and reason. Lear suffers in a m ost extraordinary way, and this suffering is tightly bound up with dram atic weather.
Lear suffers in several senses. He obviously suffers physically. He is buffeted, battered, and beaten by the storm within which he is trapped when Goneril and Regan order the doors locked on him . He suffers psychologically, and it is prim arily this that the play showcases. He is torm ented by the capriciousness of Regan and Goneril and suffers a consequent dissolution of his authority and agency. Lacking any apparent rhym e or reason, the actions of these two daughters and their cam p toward him (and his cam p) throw him into deep c onfusion over his very identity. I have argued elsewhere that "Lear, controlled by rather than in control of everything, especially (and m ost dram atically) the natural environm ent, loses his identity when he loses his ability to control spatial worth" (Ecocriticism 21). I contend there that "as he loses his voice and identity, he becomes m ore unseated, m ore unhoused, and less distinguishable from the undomesticated spaces that wildly threaten civilization. Without his land, Lear becomes frenetic in his questions about his identity. In act 1, scene 4 alone, he asks three separate tim es about his identity in a crescendo of increasing frenzy, first with a sim ple "Dost thou know me?" (l.26), then "Who am I?" (l.78), and finally, in desperation, "Does any here know m e? This is not Lear./ Does Lear walk thus? speak thus? Where are his eyes?/ Either his notion weakens, his discernings/ Are lethargied-Ha! waking? 'Tis not so./ Who is it that can tell m e who I am ? " (ll.226-30) . "The vehemence of nature's assaults hastens this old m an's decline" (21-2). He disintegrates. Yet, there is obviously m ore involved than his ability to control the spaces he inhabits. He suffers psychologically because he is unable to control the people around him and is their plaything, is their victim , their object. Indeed, Lear's psychological suffering interrogates the very viability of the category of hum an subjectivity and, in particular, the relationship between the over-estimated agency of such subjectivity versus the agency of everything else outside of it. Craig Dionne states the case well: "Lear m oves from subject to object" (150). 6 In the process, he is forced to the realization that there are other agencies surrounding him and that he needs to reassess the way in which he interacts with and relates to the world around him -social and environm ental. It is a lesson that the Trum p Adm inistration m ight do well to heed. This Adm inistration, with its anti-environm ent and clim ate-denying stances, will cause suffering, and there 5 Marshall also questions why "a one percent chance of a terrorist attack should be acted on as though it is a certainty, but a ninety percent chance of severe climate disruption is too uncertain for action" (75). 6 Dionne's complex and informative book is part of an increasing body of scholarship on the topic of Shakespeare and posthumanism, notably including Stefen Herbrechter and Ivan Callus's Posthumanist Shakespeares (2012) When Donald Trum p was elected president of the United States on November 8, 201 6, m uch of the world was shocked, and it really did not seem plausible that he would, in fact, m ake it very long as president. The cam paign was one outrageous piece of news after another, and the Presidency itself hasn't been very different. One of the things Mr. Trum p exploits is the short attention span of people: "once things are accepted into our status quo and assum ed to be part of norm al life, it requires a far higher level of threat to have them rem oved" (Marshall 54) . The quotation is from George Marshall's discussions about climate change -specifically about why clim ate change narratives are not have much effect. I yank the quotation out of context to discuss Trum p for two reasons: first, these comments (from 2014) could as easily be used today to question how and why it is that Mr. Trum p has m ade it so far. Second, it is virtually im possible now to talk about clim ate change narratives without also talking about Mr. Trum p and his decision to withdraw the US from the Paris Agreem ent on clim ate change. Marshall's comments go a long way to explaining why Trum p rem ains in office as well as why we are unable to m obilize against him and against the m ost basic things that drive clim ate change -things such as m eat, internet servers, and cars "that are already woven into the fabric of [our] lives" (54) . Part of what is involved with challenging things already woven into the fabric of our lives invariably are questions about rights, about power, and about dem ocracy. Indeed, we elect our leaders with an assum ption that they will take control of things for our benefit: we relinquish some control, we assume, for our own good.
Anyone who has children knows about the need for a certain degree of non -negotiable parental control-for the good of the children. Science fiction has been fond of iterating the notion that humanity is a child in need of control. This idea receives a frightening treatment in the 2004 blockbuster m ovie I, Robot, in which V.I.K.I. (Virtual Interactive Kinetic Intelligence), a gendered m other-figure robot, explains thus: "You charge us with you safe keeping, yet, despite our best efforts, your countries wage wars, you toxify your earth, and pursue ever m ore im aginative m eans to self-destruction. You cannot be trusted with your own survival [. . .] To protect humanity, some humans m ust be sacrificed. To insure your future, som e freedoms m ust be surrendered." The idea that we are not able to avoid the things that cause harm and suffering to us produces an ugly kind of dystopia where the only real answe r is the renunciation of dem ocracy. Questions about dem ocracy and clim ate change really require attention. Clive Ham ilton, Christophe Bonneuil, and François Gem enne ask a series of vital questions about this m atter: "How to do democracy at hom e is an urgent question when the timescales of the Earth and the hum an experience no longer align yet cannot be separated. How can democracy account for very longterm , m ulti-generational issues that extend beyond the human experience? What should politicians do? How should they speak?" (11). 7 But another and perhaps m ore critical part of the woven fabric that seems so difficult to undo and change has to do with functionality. Mainstream climate change narratives, simply put, don't really seek to cause change, and we ce rtainly don't consume them with an eye to changing our behaviors -no more than we pick up a glass of water to drown ourselves. We pick up a glass of water to m eet a need. Mainstream clim ate narratives fulfill a necessary cultural function. It is a cultural function that gives us what we need to question ourselves, our borders, our realities -indeed, the m eaning of life. In a spectacular set of comments on suffering, Joseph Am ato observes that "suffering tends to engulf our lives, encompass our m eaning, and drive us toward ultim ates that we nam e but do not understand" (16); "suffering fills us with am biguity" (17); "suffering interrogates us" (17); "suffering allows us to cross im portant borders of reality; . . . suffering com pels us to the m ost perplexing ques tions of life, evil, creation, and the nature of God" (18). And these ultimately are what clim ate change narratives offer. Som ehow, these are the m ore pressing and im mediate needs clim ate change narratives fulfill. In this, such narratives are a wild success; as vehicles for changing our behaviors toward the natural world, they are radical failures. Sad, but true.
